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The perils of integration policies: migration to Britain 
and Germany 
 
Marc Collinson (Bangor University), Nikolaos Papadogiannis (Bangor 
University) 
 
 
Executive summary 
 
• Migrant integration policies have been pursued in diverse ways, as examples 
from the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949 clearly show. 
• When using the notion of integration in public debates, policymakers and public 
commentators often present it as the opposite to the ‘ghettoisation’ of migrants. 
• This paper critically evaluates the concept of ‘integration’. It challenges the idea 
that it is the only lens through which the interaction between migrants and non-
foreign-born people can be viewed.  
• Historical evidence suggests that in place of integration, a richer and more 
positive concept of reciprocity would better inform more successful and workable 
policy outcomes.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In February 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made an unequivocal statement 
during the annual conference of her party, the Christian Democratic Union. She claimed 
that: ‘Misguided tolerance is as dangerous to our cohesion as populist incitement 
against anything foreign’. Merkel warned migrants to ‘integrate or face consequences’. 
Her words point to a dichotomy that figures prominently in public debates around 
migration: migrants either integrate or form ghettos that pose a threat to the host 
society. 
 
The notion of migrant integration has often featured in public debates, but its precise 
meaning varies. For scholars, it usually denotes the interactions with non-foreign-born 
people in which migrants engage from the moment of their arrival. By contrast, 
policymakers tend to link it to an end goal of the policies they promote. In both cases, 
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the notion usually refers to the lifestyle of migrants, but may also extend to their 
opportunities in the job market as well as their access to the institutions of the host 
society. In this policy paper, we show why precision matters when talking about 
‘integration’. Integration policies have been deployed in different ways by diverse actors, 
such as state institutions and civil society groups. In this vein, we explore the ways in 
which the notion of integration has been construed in two European societies: the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the UK. Their respective populations of migrants and 
refugees are among the most sizeable in Europe and, indeed, across the globe: 
Germany and the UK hosted the third and fifth largest population of international 
migrants in the world in 2017, respectively. Moreover, these countries have followed 
different trajectories in their institutional approaches to integration. A notable case in 
point is the relative openness of the German government towards accepting refugees in 
2016, by comparison with most other EU countries. The Integration Act, the first 
comprehensive federal law on integration entered into force in Germany in the same 
year. Simultaneously, in the context of the Brexit referendum, integration seems to have 
all but disappeared from public debates in the UK. 
 
Despite the diversity of integration initiatives in Germany and Britain, they are largely 
premised on similarly questionable basic assumptions. The second aim of this policy 
paper is to reflect critically on these perceptions. In particular, policymakers largely 
construe ‘integration’ as the adaptation of the migrants to the norms of the host society 
– as manifest in Merkel’s comment – ignoring the impact of migrants on the cultural 
patterns and ideas of the host society. Moreover, in pursuing this goal, they frequently 
neglect the interaction between migrants and non-foreign-born people in contexts 
outside the host society. In critically evaluating these points, we also address alternative 
ways in which policymakers can promote connections between migrants and non-
foreign-born individuals. We challenge the notion that the relations between non-
foreign-born people and migrants should revolve solely or chiefly around the 
problematic dichotomy of integration or ghettoisation of migrants. 
 
 
Great Britain: the contested nature of integration  
 
From assimilating nineteenth-century Irish migrants to Eastern European Jews fleeing 
oppression in the early twentieth century, Britain has often attracted large groups of 
migrants. Its citizenship was vaguely drawn. In the post-war era, after the passing of the 
British Nationality Act 1948, migrants to Britain from its empire were able to attain the 
designation of ‘Citizen of the UK and Colonies’. This could be gained through birth as a 
British subject or naturalisation. The influx of migrants from the colonies was not always 
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welcomed by the non-foreign-born population, however. In 1958, race riots saw 
migrants targeted. 
 
British state institutions did not try to develop a comprehensive policy on how to address 
migrants from former colonies until the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, in a May 1966 speech 
to the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 
tried to combine integration with respect towards migrant cultures. He defined 
integration as ‘equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance’. This speech was representative of a metropolitan liberal discourse. 
Rhetoric was backed by legislation, with Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966 
facilitating the provision of extra funding for local authorities in areas with large migrant 
populations. However, Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, delivered in April 1968, 
and the apparent local popularity of anti-immigrant groups, undermined any consensus. 
In response, Edward Heath’s Conservative Government legislated to change the right to 
citizenship through ‘patriality’ (which defined whether a migrant was exempted from 
immigration controls, possessing a ‘right of abode’) and implemented an annual, 
renewable, work permit system. Although Labour limited some of its effects after 1974, 
Heath’s legislation remained in force. 
 
More recently and inspired by protest against the authoritarian ‘institutionally racist’ 
nature of the state in the 1970s-1990s, Tony Blair’s administration developed an 
agenda of ‘multiculturalism’. Analogous to the Jenkins Doctrine, it aimed to move away 
from assimilation, but led to criticism that it reinforced difference, and ghettoised 
communities.  
 
Migration policies have never received ample long-term attention from British politicians. 
Deeper issues, such as widespread poverty, deprivation, and disadvantage, have 
remained unaddressed. Limited state resources have further constrained alternative 
political options. Similarly, the active presence of the far right has long influenced 
political debate, with groups including the British National Party and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party securing significant media coverage, if not votes. The continued 
presence of anti-migrant sentiment has even led the previously liberal Tony Blair to infer 
that the failure of multiculturalism requires a drive towards greater integration. Up to the 
present day, terms, such as ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have been approached in 
a patchy and often contradictory manner by the British state institutions.  
 
 
Germany: towards national integration policies 
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Germany has been, like the UK, a country that has received numerous refugees, worker 
and student migrants. Germany’s switch from a country that mainly exported migrants to 
one that had more incoming than outgoing migrants dates back to 1893. This tendency 
extended on into the post-1945 years. While Britain and other European countries such 
as the Netherlands have mostly received postcolonial migration, this has not been the 
case for West Germany and, subsequently, the reunified Germany. Instead, it has 
attracted since the late 1940s waves of refugees from Eastern Europe, Turkey 
Yugoslavia and, more recently, Syria and Afghanistan. Migrant workers from Southern 
Europe have also moved there. By 1988, over 5.2 million of those migrants had decided 
to remain permanently in the host society.  
 
Despite hosting a large population of refugees and migrants, the German state and civil 
society were initially quite reluctant to accept them as integral parts of the host society. 
The 1970s, as Hess and Moser show, were marked by a watershed in institutional 
approaches to migrants in West Germany. The state slowly began to consider the 
integration of the migrants into the host society. This was spearheaded by initiatives of 
municipal authorities, such as in Munich. Moreover, the federal government, which 
comprised the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, began in the late 1970s to 
consider the integration of migrants. Crucially, the federal Auslaenderbeauftragter, 
namely the policymaker in charge of migration policy, Heinz Kühn, argued in 1979 that 
numerous migrants were long-term rather than temporary residents of West Germany. 
However, the federal government remained cautious towards the notion of ‘integration’, 
especially once a coalition government was formed in 1982 between the Christian 
Democrats and the Free Democrats.According to the former party, the senior partner in 
the coalition governments between 1982 and 1998, (West) Germany was not a country 
of immigration. 
 
The attitudes of the federal government began to change more decisively only when a 
new coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Greens assumed power in 
1998. This government introduced a law reforming citizenship rights that introduced jus 
soli – the principle of citizenship through birth. This made it easier for a child born of 
non-German parents to acquire German citizenship. From that point on, the 
governments led by both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats have 
committed themselves to the goal of migrant integration since the 2000s. 
 
Overall, in the Federal Republic of Germany, approaches to migrant integration have 
followed a different trajectory than in the UK. In federal Germany integration initiatives 
began at the local level, but have gradually spilled over to the national level.  
 
Integration policies and their problematic assumptions 
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At first sight, it might appear that (West) German institutions evolved more inclusive 
approaches to migrants and refugees, which contrasts positively with what has been 
happening in the UK. However, in both cases their integration policies draw on some 
problematic assumptions, which have reinforced a negative bias against migrants and 
refugees.  
 
A key shared perception is that migrants and refugees need to adapt to the host culture. 
Integration policies in both countries have encouraged migrants to become culturally 
similar to the non-foreign-born population. Policymakers in favour of integration largely 
believe that peaceful coexistence should rely on a homogeneous society. As Ash Amin 
has aptly remarked, this is ‘the imaginary that each society exists as a homeland with its 
own people’. Policymakers frequently associate a homogenous society with dominant 
norms of the non-foreign-born people. A telling example in this respect is the National 
Integration Plan of the Federal Government in Germany of 2007. As Serhat Karakayali 
has shown, this referred to ‘our’ and ‘national’ culture, into which foreign-born people 
had to integrate. Similarly, after 2007 the new British premier Gordon Brown directed a 
re-emphasis on Britishness, forming part of a Europe-wide trend of party leaders 
appealing to vague nationalist sentiments. 
 
There are, of course, some counter examples showing that influential politicians began 
to approach integration as a process of mutual influence; Roy Jenkins is a case in point. 
Moreover, in the case of Germany, Merkel has recently argued that “Islam is part of the 
German culture”. Nevertheless, the line that distinguishes integration from assimilation 
is a blurred one. Policymakers tend to favour activity that renders migrants culturally 
alike to the non-foreign-born population. Tellingly, in his 1966 speech, Jenkins claimed 
that the children of first-generation immigrants dressed and spoke ‘much as we do’, 
apparently without recognising how this attitude might imperil the cultural diversity he 
desired. 
 
The demand for adaptation to the norms of the non-foreign-born population poses the 
question, ‘which national culture?’ For instance, a duality of nationality has long been 
prevalent within the UK. Britishness itself has arguably been diluted by non-foreign-born 
citizens, as well as migrants. In a composite nation, many people, migrants and non-
foreign-born, readily define themselves as English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish, as 
opposed to or in addition to British. Britishness as associated with the UK’s imperial 
history adds to the problems, especially amongst those descended from former colonial 
subjects. Similarly, class affiliation, and regional and civic identities have further 
complicated the idea of a unified national culture.  
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Integration policies also tend to assume the superiority of the indig non-foreign-born 
enous cultures over migrant cultures. In the case of Germany, public commentators and 
policymakers tend to portray migrants and refugees as ‘backwards’ in comparison to the 
non-foreign-born population. This is applied particularly, but not solely, to Muslims. A 
telling case is the sexual education offered primarily to refugees, but also to migrants 
residing in Germany, by a webpage supported by the federal government. This project 
was launched in the aftermath of the 2015/16 New Year’s Eve sexual assaults that 
occurred mainly in Cologne: refugees and migrants were initially suspected to have 
been the perpetrators of most of these, though in fact few perpetrators have since been 
identified.  
 
Policy initiatives relating to integration tend to neglect the positive changes that migrants 
and refugees can bring to the receiving society and its culture. A case in point are the 
solidarity initiatives developed among Greek politicised migrants living in West Germany 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These initiatives targeted the dictatorial regime 
(Junta), which ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974. They included not only Greek 
migrants, but also non-foreign-born activists. They also encompassed other migrants, 
such as Spaniards, who simultaneously struggled against the Francoist regime. As 
Papadogiannis’ work has shown, these initiatives allowed for intense interactions 
among some migrants and non-foreign-born Germans. Many West Germans became 
accustomed to Greek cultural products, such as music, as well as coming to have a 
better understanding of how Greek affairs intersected with German history and society. 
In the context of their joint action with Greek migrants’ initiatives against the Greek 
Junta, non-foreign-born activists took further the need to acknowledge Nazi activity in 
Greece during the 1940s, including atrocities which had been barely discussed in West 
Germany up to that point. 
 
These anti-Junta initiatives did not explicitly aim at integrating migrants into West 
German society. Many of the activist migrants dreamed of returning to Greece, once 
their financial condition improved and the dictatorial regime collapsed. Nevertheless, 
some of these migrants remained in West Germany, even after democracy was 
restored in Greece. They would retain some of the contacts with other migrants and with 
non-foreign-born activists which they had developed between 1967 and 1974. Their 
increased connectivity was not a process of their adaptation to the host society, but a 
two-way traffic: the taverna Terzo Mondo in Berlin, for example, was created in 1972 by 
the Greek migrant Kostas Papanastasiou and remains today a popular meeting point for 
migrants from diverse origins living in Berlin and for non-foreign-born Germans. It hosts 
not only artistic events that reflect all these cultural backgrounds, but has also served as 
a space where both migrants and non-foreign-born Germans have met to discuss and 
develop joint political initiatives. 
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Meanwhile, in the UK, it was the activism within some immigrant communities that 
reshaped political perceptions of the police, especially in London. This activism led to 
campaigns within the Labour party and civil society for greater accountability, most 
notably and enduringly in relation to the Stephen Lawrence case. This complex 
connectivity is barely captured by the typical banal, unidirectional integration initiatives. 
Research suggests that the alternative to integration is not necessarily the emergence 
of migrant ghettos, but can be the creation of culturally rich and diverse communities of 
reciprocity and engagement. Many migrants and refugees feel attached to countries of 
origin and destination. Either integration or segregation are not the only options, nor are 
they the options that many take. Double allegiance is a notable tendency among people 
of Turkish origin living in Germany: according to Ayhan Kaya, 27% of them felt affiliated 
with both countries in the early 2000s. Meanwhile, as Bidit Lal Dey et al have argued, 
young British South Asian adults also demonstrate an attachment to the UK and their 
‘ancestral country/community/culture’. 
 
Policymakers should not expect either first or second-generation migrants simply to ‘fit’ 
to the dominant norms of the receiving society and should be careful in employing such 
metaphors. More crucially, they should consider both how migrants may get 
accustomed to non-foreign-born cultures, but also how they can enrich them. 
Policymakers should not simply compel migrants to learn the official language(s) of the 
host society, but should multiply the opportunities of non-foreign-born people to learn 
the languages that migrants use. They should diversify educational curricula to reflect 
new cultural and social influences and histories relevant to migrant populations. Overall, 
the guiding principle for migration policies should be, in our opinion, to cultivate an 
open-ended dialogue among non-foreign-born and migrant cultures. 
 
The nation-state as a facilitator 
 
Promoting a dialogue between migrant and non-foreign-born communities poses an 
important question: should the institutions of the nation-state be the ones that initiate 
and safeguard this dialogue? 
 
The nation-state is a key to promoting strong connectivity among diverse migrants and 
non-foreign-born people. It can enable migrants to become actively involved in the 
social life of the host society. Crucially, it can grant or deprive migrants of citizenship 
rights. Having the right to vote and gain election into positions of power allows migrants 
and refugees to work alongside non-foreign-born people in setting the policymaking 
agenda for the host society. Migrants and refugees should have more such 
opportunities in the future. Similarly, the nation-state may play an important role in 
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promoting economic equality among migrants and non-foreign-born people, enhancing 
their interaction on equal terms at the workplace. Making sure that legislation grants 
migrants equal rights to non-foreign-born employees and vigilantly inspecting its 
implementation is yet another crucial contribution of the nation-state to the interaction of 
migrants and non-foreign-born people. In this vein, the welfare state must be efficient in 
offering both the migrants and the non-foreign-born individuals of all classes equal 
opportunities for a high-quality education, healthcare, housing and job opportunities. 
The lack of equitable provision of public services to all communities in Britain has often 
contributed to the scapegoating of migrants. Quite tellingly, as Peter Shapely has 
demonstrated, those white residents of Glodwick who suffered from deprivation in the 
early 1970s blamed this on their migrant neighbours. 
 
Therefore, the nation-state can serve as a facilitator in the relations among diverse 
migrants and non-foreign-born people. However, instead of promoting the purported 
‘national’ culture of the host society, it should take a light-touch approach. The ideas 
and values of migrants should be offered equal consideration in the context of an open-
ended dialogue.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Policymakers in Germany and the UK need to formulate their policies carefully in 
respect of migrants, especially given the size of the migrant populations in each of those 
countries. Overall, the options that policymakers have in relation to migrants are not well 
explored, and tend to be limited by the assumption that integration or segregation are 
the only approaches. Policymakers tend to define integration as migrants becoming, to 
a greater or lesser extent, culturally similar to the non-foreign-born people in the host 
society. However, better policy outcomes would be sustained by attention to a genuine 
two-way traffic: an open-ended dialogue, where ideas and practices from both migrant 
and non-foreign-born cultures can blend and offer empowerment to all people, 
regardless of differences in gender, ethnicity and age. A common cultural background 
does not need to exist, only a willingness on the part of diverse migrants and non-
foreign-born people to interact and learn from one another. Policymakers in the host 
societies must critically evaluate the cultural bias manifest in the texts exclusively 
promoting integration. In taking such a light-touch approach, the nation-state still has an 
important role to play in enhancing the social connectivity between migrants and the 
non-foreign-born population. Historical evidence suggests that the existence of an 
efficient welfare state that supports both the migrants and the non-foreign-born people 
is also key. Lack of service provision may contribute to the latter scapegoating the 
former for sub-par education, healthcare, housing as well as limited job opportunities.  
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Workable effective policy in this area requires offering migrants more options than either 
‘integrate’ or ‘face the consequences’. Should policymakers take a step further and 
discard the label of ‘integration’? Given the normative load that it carries, this might be a 
plausible suggestion. One viable alternative might be radically to redefine the way in 
which the notion is employed, recognising the complex and potentially valuable ways 
through which migrants and non-foreign-born people interact. A term such as 
‘reciprocity’ might be best to describe such an approach.  
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